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Book Reviews
long remain required reading as the case for the prosecution against Togliatti. He continues to have many well-placed defenders, but Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky have raised
the Togliatti question to a level of high historical importance.
✣

✣

✣

Nicole Alecu de Flers, EU Foreign Policy and the Europeanization of Neutral States:
Comparing Irish and Austrian Foreign Policy. London: Routledge, 2012. 167 pp.
Reviewed by Günter Bischof, University of New Orleans
The convergence of national foreign policies with the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) is a crucial challenge all EU memberstates face. If EU-Europe ever wants its voice to be heard as a powerful actor in the international arena, such a common foreign policy is needed. How do you hold on to
national traditions in the face of unrelenting pressure from Brussels to align your foreign policy (bilateral and multilateral) with the demands of the EU’s central agenda?
Large EU member-states such as Germany, France, and Great Britain, all of which are
also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), naturally have
more weight in the EU’s common councils than do small states. Once the CFSP became a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) after 1999, setting up a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), small states such as Austria and Ireland, which
are not NATO members, had a problem on their hands. Participating in EU military
interventionism and being forced to include defense matters in their foreign policy
agenda does not square with their neutral status. Alecu de Flers’s tight case study pursues the growing convergence of these two small EU member-states with the everconstricting common European foreign and security policy in spite of the recent
militarization of EU foreign policy. In Robert Kagan’s controversial language, maybe
the EU is heading toward being from Mars rather than Venus.
Alecu de Flers brieºy summarizes the evolution of EFSP from the European Political Cooperation established in 1970 to the Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam
(1999) Treaties and the evolution of controversial defense tasks being incorporated
into the tightening EU foreign and security agendas. She explains how the breakup of
Yugoslavia and the crisis in the Balkans demonstrated the powerlessness of the EU to
respond to crisis scenarios on the European continent and the need for “robust” interventionism (p. 20). She is a sure guide through the baroque tergiversations of EU foreign and security policy and the irritating salad of acronyms that goes with it to describe Brussels’s arcane politics. Her study stays on the surface level, however, and does
not go into any depth analyzing crises such as Kosovo or Iraq.
The meat and bones of this book comes in the two case studies on Ireland and
Austria. Alecu de Flers analyzes how the foreign policy of these two neutrals was
“Europeanized” as a result of their admission into the European Economic Community/European Union in 1973 (Ireland) and 1995 (Austria). In three chapters each,
she investigates how Ireland’s and Austria’s institutional framework in their foreign
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ofªces and the substance of their foreign policy were “Europeanized” and how this
“distancing” (p. 50) from their traditions affected their neutral status. Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs needed to move away from its almost exclusive focus on
relations with the United Kingdom and expand its missions to meet the demands of
the CFSP, whereas Austria’s Foreign Ministry was better prepared to meet the demands of participation. Although Washington and Moscow were the most important
foreign capitals in the Cold War era, the central focus of Dublin’s and Vienna’s foreign
policy became Brussels after they joined the EU (including appointment to new posts
such as “European Correspondent”). Now three-quarters of Dublin’s time in foreign
policy is dedicated to CFSP matters (p. 100). CFSP has led to a “broadening of the
foreign policy agenda” (p. 36) and to both a “Europeanization” and a “globalization”
of Irish and Austrian foreign affairs (p. 103). Most notably, Irish and Austrian voting
behavior in the United Nations became closely aligned (“Europeanized”) with the voting behavior of EU members after their joining the EU. The bulk of Alecu de Flers’s
empirical evidence is dedicated to explaining this shift in EU voting behavior and gets
bogged down in pedestrian vote counting.
How much room to maneuver, then, do small states have in the common EFSP?
Although Ireland developed some speciªc expertise (Falklands crisis, South African
apartheid, human rights abuses in East Timor), Austria’s expertise in the Western Balkans was tapped by Brussels after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Dublin and Vienna leave
it to the EU “greats” to deªne the CFSP. Do small states have leverage? Alecu de Flers
ignores a vast body of literature on the “leverage of the weak” during the Cold War.
Tony Smith with his “pericentric” approach and Hope Harrison have shown what
might be called “the power of the impotent.” Even Austria displayed some leverage
during the Austrian State Treaty negotiations. Alecu de Flers’s study seems to suggest
that after the Cold War the EU took on a stronger role in directing its members’ foreign policy than NATO and the Warsaw Pact did in aligning their members during
the East-West conºict. Such substantive change over time, important to the historian,
seems to fall by the wayside in the theory-driven approach of the political scientist.
Alecu de Flers operates with a similarly static concept of neutrality. She notes
how the “Petersberg tasks” of the ESPD required neutral members to join the bandwagon in sensitive new ªelds of peacekeeping and crisis management (p. 21). She rallies clear empirical evidence of how public opinion in both countries insisted on the
maintenance of neutrality (e.g., p. 119). The EU generally ignored the concerns of
neutral member-states. The political elites in Ireland and Austria were fully aware of
the EU’s consistent demands to water down their neutrality. Although Ireland held
referenda that saw the public vote in favor of neutrality, Austrian governments largely
ignored the public because of fears that the CFSP security agenda might be rejected.
The EU’s ESPD thus has been consistently undermining the neutrality status of its
member-states—this may be the (unacknowledged) major ªnding of Alecu de Flers’s
study.
✣
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